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Bruno Latour: War of the Worlds: What About Peace? Chicago: Prickly
Paradigm, 2002.
Bruno Latour is widely known for his contributions to science studies,1 debates
about postmodernism,2 and, through the spread of his “actor-network theory,”3
methods in the social sciences. While one can draw connections between these
works, it is hard to pigeonhole Latour. His originality, style of argumentation, and
aversion to being deﬁned vis-a`-vis other thinkers make Latour enigmatic. More
recently, Latour has called into question elements of his earlier project, arguing in
his 2002 treatise, War of the Worlds: What About Peace?, that critique has “overshot
its target” 4 and asking “why has critique run out of steam?” in a 2004 essay of the
same name.5 That puts Latour, who urged us to follow scientists to understand social
life, under the microscope himself.
Latour’s Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy,6 (hereafter
“Politics”) comes to the English-reading audience in the midst of the debate over
Latour’s doubts about critique. This coincidence is auspicious, since it allows us to
1See especially Bruno Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts (Los
Angeles: Sage, 1979); Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1987); and Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science
Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999a).
2Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
3Latour, “The Trouble with Actor-Network Theory,” Philsophia, 25, 3–4, 1997; and Latour,Reassembling the
Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
4Latour: War of the Worlds: What About Peace? (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2002).
5Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?: From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical
Inquiry, 30, 2, 2004b.
6Bruno Latour: Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2004a); Latour, Politiques de la Nature: Comment Faire Entrer les Sciences en De´mocratie, Paris: La
De´couverte, 1999b.
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read the recent post-critical essays alongside Latour’s most important work since
We Have Never Been Modern. 7 Politics is an often brilliant attempt to theorize “political
ecology,” a philosophical project with two broad aims. On one hand, it attempts to
overcome the concept of nature as an asocial, objective source of truth. For Latour,
this concept of nature is “the result of a political division” that identiﬁes nature
with “what is objective and indisputable” and collects all that is “subjective and dis-
putable” under the guise of the social. 8 Since nature is treated as the external real
world, appeals to nature situate actors within a political order in which non-human
actors cannot speak, and certain spokespeople (scientists, moralists) are privileged
at the expense of others. Political ecology is therefore a critique of actually existing
environmental politics, which claims to speak for nature. To practice political ecology
is not to bring more “Science” to bear on “Nature” (terms often capitalized by Latour
to emphasize their singularity) and promote conservation. Rather, Latour’s political
ecology means “the destruction of the idea of nature”9 and the politicization of prac-
tices that naturalize.
This brings us to political ecology’s second aim: to recognize the complex associ-
ations of entangled socionatural beings, instruments, and practices that constitute
different natures. Political ecology endeavors to produce new collectives of facts,
values, and practices that will allow plural actors – humans and non-humans – to
speak about common “matters of concern.”10 Latour takes the sciences as the
model for this experimental work, which entails creating more well-articulated collec-
tives that “include more articles. . .[and] mixes them together with greater degrees of
freedom.”11 This second aim includes both a descriptive and a normative aspect. The
descriptive element lies in the adoption of the appropriate approach to recognize the
modern, complex world for what it is: instead of speaking for “Nature,” political ecol-
ogy seeks to recognize and extend the complexes of humans, non-humans, facts, and
values that comprise particular natures. For Latour, reality exists, but it is neither
unproblematic nor singular, subjective nor objective; realities are experimentally
constituted as ensembles of practices and human and non-human actors. Consider
the following illustration:
Let us suppose that a cellar in Burgundy invites you to a wine tasting. . ..[I]n
the course of an hour or two you are going to become sensitive, in the process
of continually comparing wines, to differences of which you were completely
ignorant the day before. The cellar, the arrangement of glasses on the barrel,
the notation on the labels, the pedagogy of the cellar master, the progress of
the experimental procedure all contribute to forming an instrument that allows
you . . .to acquire a nose and palate . . . . Let us suppose that you are then asked
to go into the laboratory and discover, in a white-tiled room, a complex instru-
mentation that is said to allow you to connect the distinctions that you have
7Latour, 1991, op. cit.
8Latour, 2004a, op. cit., p. 231
9Ibid., p. 25.
10Ibid., p. 114.
11Ibid., p. 86.
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just sensed on your tongue with other differences, here recorded in the form of
peaks or valleys on graph paper or a computer screen. . ..[W]e no longer want
to say that the ﬁrst tasting is subjective. . .while the second is objecti-
ve. . ..Thanks to the cooper, thanks to the gas chromatographer, we have
become sensitive to differences that were invisible before, some on our palate,
others on logarithmic paper. We have gone beyond connective sensations,
words, calculations to a pre-existing external thing; thanks to the multipli-
cation of instruments, we have become capable of registering new distinctions.
In the production of these differences and in the multiplication of these nuan-
ces, we must thus count ourselves and our noses, ourselves and our instru-
ments. The more devices we have at our disposal, the more time we spend
in the cellar. . .the more realities abound.12
Latour’s account of the production of the wine differences does not reﬂect a social
explanation of the way a subject approaches an object; nor is this a story of “social
construction” of wine differences with no objective qualities. Yet the truth of these
differences is neither strictly subjective (“taste”) nor objective (“scientiﬁc fact”). In
Latour’s view, “reality grows”13 as actors, practices, propositions, and instruments
create new coalitions of fact and value, being and recognition. The nose and palate,
lab instruments, logarithmic paper, and wine constitute a reality.
Though Latour’s political ecology is descriptive, insofar as it provides a way of
approaching particular natures (as with the wine differences), it is equally a normative
project. This is clearest in the second half of Politics, where political ecology collides
with liberal-democratic political theory. By bringing the sciences into democracy,
Latour feels that we will create the conditions for a more democratic and just
world. Politics reveals that the Constitution called for at the conclusion of We Have
Never Been Modern 14 is both a means of describing the actual constitution of
the world and a political constitution. Drafting this constitution entails addressing
the problems of politics, science, speech, and ecology together:
Not a single line has been written – at least within the Western tradition – in
which the terms “nature,” “natural order,” “natural law,” “natural right”-
have not been followed. . .by an afﬁrmation concerning the way to reform pub-
lic life. . ..When one appeals to the notion of nature, the assemblage that it
authorizes counts for inﬁnitely more than the ontological quality of “naturalness,”
whose origin it would guarantee. 15
Overcoming the political effects of this metaphysical afﬁliation will require that we
“put into play” the four concepts that have structured Western thought about
environmental politics: “oikos, logos, phusis, and polis.”16 With this claim – Politics’
12Ibid., pp. 84–5.
13Ibid., p. 85.
14Latour, 1991, op. cit.
15Latour, 2004a, op. cit., pp. 28–9.
16Ibid., p. 2.
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most daring thesis – Latour suggests the destructuring of the metaphysical tradition
that has linked truth and politics through nature.
Unfortunately, Latour’s way of proposing that we take up such work is disap-
pointingly formulaic and idealist. The overarching narrative of Politics aims at joining
these three critiques of Nature, Science, and politics: as Science gives way to the
sciences, as Nature loses its grip as the singular basis of truth, and as non-human nature
becomes part of political life, then politics will be more just. For Latour, every
advance in the philosophical destruction of “Nature” reﬂects progress for political
ecology qua political project:
By refusing to tie politics to humans, subjects, or freedom [as in humanist
political philosophy], and to tie Science to objects, nature, or necessity, we
have discovered the work common to politics and to the sciences alike: stirring
the entities of the collective together in order to make them articulable and to
make them speak. There is nothing more political than this activity, and nothing
more scientiﬁc.17
Making collectives that can speak is a reasonable goal, and arguably a political one.
But whereas Latour argues persuasively for the theoretical importance of such
work, he never offers an equivalent explanation for why this should be a political pri-
ority. Instead he produces a kind of constitution made up of political roles, forms of
power, collective requirements, and responsibilities to different actors in a manner
that is stultifying in its wonkishness: in Box 3.1, for instance, we ﬁnd his recapitulation
of “the two forms of power and the four requirements that must allow the collective
to proceed according to due process to the exploration of the common world.”18
Readers who are not put off by the tone of Latour’s rules of order may wonder
how he expects these requirements to be met (e.g., #2: “make sure the number of
voices that participate. . .is not arbitrarily short-sighted,”; #4: “once the propositions
have been instituted, you shall no longer question their legitimate presence”).19 These
metaphorical powers are presented with no analysis of the barriers that exist to their
actual existence and no discussion of how they might come into being. Latour rarely
mentions his sources in the main text, but his theory of “experimental deliberation”
seems to be the product of joining Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality
with the political theory of John Dewey. From Dewey, Latour borrows the notion
of a public-state relation that is not a priori but experimentally produced,20 and
Latour’s emphasis on making articulate collectives simply translates Habermas’s
17Ibid., p. 89.
18Ibid., p. 109.
19Ibid.
20In The Public and its Problems, Dewey argues that what matters in any human association is “how they come
to be connected” and that the scope of the state’s functions is to be “experimentally determined” (J. Dewey,
The Public and its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927, p. 74). On Latour’s use of Dewey, see: 271 n8, 275
n30 and n34, 280 n20, and 281 n25. Note that all of these citations appear in the footnotes; Dewey is never
(to my knowledge) actually discussed in the main text. The same is true of Habermas: cf. pages 262 n16, 263
n21, 266 n6, and 281 n22. The only reference to Habermas in the main text is on p. 171.
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principle of discourse ethics – “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a prac-
tical discourse” 21 – in a way that includes non-humans.22
As the argument unfolds and the lists of “skills,” “powers,” and “roles”
accumulate, the humor and clarity of the early chapters fade, and Politics becomes
pedantic and tediously repetitive. Concrete illustrations, such as the wine cellar, are
rare. And Latour’s neologisms steadily proliferate so that one reads through an
increasing density of internally referring terms (Politics includes a glossary with
deﬁnitions of no less than 68 Latourisms). These points provide a clue to the
book’s major weaknesses. Politics offers a philosophical system with its own
language and logic that lacks worldliness. It’s nice to imagine, as Latour beckons,
“that a cellar in Burgundy invites you to a wine tasting,”23 but what does this have
to do with political struggles? Latour never deigns to apply his approach to a com-
plex historical-political situation. The grand metaphor that sustains Politics of
Nature – that opening the sciences broadens democratic possibilities – proves to
be an empty gesture. The problem is not that Latour is simply too philosophically
abstract. It is that his shift to a political register is asserted with so little historical
and theoretical care that one cannot but demand some stronger arguments and
illustrations.
Herein lies Politics’s major failure. Latour does not inquire into the political and
historical conditions under which realities actually emerge – outside of the wine cel-
lar. The thorny problems of power, discourse, and history are wholly elided. In turn-
ing towards Habermas’s communicative approach to political ethics, Latour does not
ask why only certain actors can speak effectively. He has no way to account for the
interests of the scientists he encourages us to follow. His discussion of the state24 is
arguably the weakest section of Politics. Citing Dewey’s experimental view of the pub-
lic-state relation, Latour sets himself against all “totalizing deﬁnitions of the State.”25
But rather than exploring, in non-derivationist fashion, why the capitalist state tends
to adopt the liberal-democratic form,26 Latour presupposes the impossibility of
any non-deterministic Marxist account of politics.27 Of all of Marxism, Latour
says “its goal was not to rehabilitate politics [!] but to subject it still further to the
laws of . . . Science.”28 The fact that Latour dodges a serious confrontation with
21J. Habermas, “Discourse Ethics,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1990), p. 185. Republished in J. Habermas, The Habermas Reader (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1996), pp.
180–192.
22Latour, 2004a, op. cit., p. 262 n21.
23Latour was born into “a wine family in Burgundy not Bordeaux” according to his web page: http://
www.ensmp.fr/PagePerso/CSI/Bruno_Latour.html/faq-en.html.
24Latour, 2004a, op. cit., pp. 200–209.
25Ibid., p. 281.
26See, for example, B. Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1990).
27Latour, 2004a, op. cit., p. 267 n9.
28Ibid., p. 271 n10; see also 281 n24.
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Marx29 leaves open the question of whether it is possible to weave his approach to
scientiﬁc practices with a nuanced, historically informed approach to power.30
The repudiation of critique?
Do you see why I am worried? I myself have spent some time in the past trying
to show the “lack of scientiﬁc certainty” inherent in the construction of facts.
[. . .] But I did not exactly aim at fooling the public by obscuring the certainty
of a closed argument – or did I?. . ..I’d like to believe that, on the contrary, I
intended to emancipate the public from a prematurely naturalized objectiﬁed
fact. Was I foolishly mistaken?31
These weaknesses of Politics cast light on Latour’s recent doubts about whether
critique has gone too far.32 These concerns emerged in War of the Worlds 33 and were
elaborated in “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Latour’s anxieties are piqued by
two facts – or rather the interpretation of two facts. On one hand (the right), he is
faced with denial by U.S. Republicans of the truth about global warming. On the
other hand (the left) appear critical interpretations of September 11, 2001. Latour
ﬁnds a frightening parallel between these two situations. In each case the project of
complicating the facts about facts – i.e., being critical about knowledge – has gone
too far. Since social construction has gotten out of hand, we have lost our ability
to say what’s what. “Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a
fact whether you like it or not?” Latour demands. “Why can’t I simply say that the
argument is closed for good?”34
29Latour also avoids Derrida. I agree with Timothy Mitchell that Latour’s “brief dismissal of Derrida” inWe
Have Never Been Modern is “disappointing” (T. Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 309). Latour’s failure to address Derrida’s critique of Wes-
tern metaphysics and its treatment of truth and nature in Politics is even more unfortunate, cf. J. Derrida, Of
Grammatology, G. Chakravorty Spivak, trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). As with his
broadsides againstMarxism, Latour criticizes Derrida – for being critical! – and yet without engaging with his
arguments. Latour asks: “Since September 2001 . . .[does] idle criticism not look superﬁcial now that nihilism
is truly striking at ‘us’ – at US – putting what we call civilization in great danger of being found hollow?Who
needs to add another deconstruction to a heap of broken debris?” (War of the Worlds, p. 1–2). The same ques-
tion reappears in the opening of “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?”: “Is it really the task of the huma-
nities to add deconstruction to destruction [after 9/11]?” (Latour, 2004b, op. cit., p. 225). For Derrida’s reading
of 9/11 – more rigorous than Latour’s – see J. Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Ju¨rgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
30As for instance in the work of Donna Haraway (see D. Haraway, The Haraway Reader (New York:
Routledge, 2003). Haraway is only cited once by Latour in Politics (260, n58) – without dwelling on her
socialist and feminist politics.
31Latour, 2004b, op. cit., p. 227. Quotations taken from the longer version of the essay published in Critical
Inquiry. Read alongside Politics, the version of “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” published by Harper’s
feels like a paranoid rant. In its six paragraphs the reader is pummeled relentlessly by more than 40 questions.
32Latour, 2002 and 2004b, op. cit.
33Essentially an abstract of Politics, War of the Worlds was published as a slender book by Prickly Paradigm.
As compared with Politics it makes for quick reading, since Latour does not have room to introduce his
terms, rules, and powers. War of the Worlds could be substituted for Politics in the classroom.
34Latour, 2004b, op. cit.
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One reason the argument isn’t over is because, as Latour knows, the ensembles of
actors, facts, values, and effects woven through the global climate change debate are
vast and complex. Close up one fact and others open. But a second reason the warm-
ing debate continues – one Latour is apparently unwilling to accept – is that certain
powerful groups keep it open against better reason. Such an answer presupposes, of
course, a theory of class interests, and for Latour such explanations are no more than
conspiracy talk:
[W]hat’s the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized, that is a
teachable version of social critique inspired for instance by a too quick reading
of. . .Pierre Bourdieu? In both cases, you have to learn to become suspicious of
everything people say because “of course we all know” that they live in the
thralls of a complete illusio on their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck
and an explanation is requested for what is really going on, in both cases again,
it is the same appeal to powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always con-
sistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we in the academy like to use
more elevated causes – society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, ﬁelds of
forces, empires, capitalism – while conspiracists like to portray a miserable
bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I ﬁnd something troublingly
similar in the structure of the explanation. . ..What if explanations resorting
automatically to power, society, discourse had outlived their usefulness?35
Latour seems to feel that the Left is incapable of doing anything except attribut-
ing the world’s problems to invisible forces. This is a rude caricature of critique, but
one Latour applies to everyone from Marx to Derrida. What distinguishes conspiracy
theories from historically and theoretically informed accounts is precisely the refusal,
by the latter, to be satisﬁed with reductive theories that account for everything. One of
the main tasks of critique is to discern between the strengths of different explanations;
the mark of conspiracy is the lack of rigor and evidence. The solution to the dilemma
Latour notes here is simply to struggle against just such facile accounts of power that
attribute problems to “powerful agents hidden in the dark.”
But precisely this sort of critique is foreclosed by Latour, who is allergic to
attempts to think through the connections between, for instance, capitalism and vio-
lence. The question of September 11 ﬁgures prominently in his recent essays. He asks:
“What has critique become when. . .Baudrillard claims in a published book that the
World Trade Towers destroyed themselves under their own weight. . .undermined
by the utter nihilism inherent in capitalism itself – as if the terrorist planes were pulled
to suicide by the powerful attraction of this black hole of nothingness.”36 As Latour’s
critique of critique hinges largely on this reading of Baudrillard’s essay, this reading is
worth pursuing. Unfortunately, Latour does not say exactly where Baudrillard makes
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
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the purported claim. As far as I can tell, the passage that piques his outrage comes
from the end of Baudrillard’s essay, “Requiem for the Twin Towers:”37
The collapse of the towers is the major symbolic event [of September 11]. Ima-
gine they had not collapsed, or only one had collapsed: the effect would not
have been the same at all. The fragility of global power would not have
been so strikingly proven. The towers, which were the emblem of that
power, still embody it in their dramatic end, which resembles a suicide. Seeing
them collapse themselves, as if by implosion, one had the impression that they
were committing suicide. . ..Were the Twin Towers destroyed, or did they col-
lapse?. . ..The architectural object was destroyed, but it was the symbolic object
which was targeted and which it was intended to demolish. One might think
the physical destruction brought about the symbolic collapse. But in fact no
one, not even the terrorists, had reckoned on the total destruction of the
towers. It was, in fact, their symbolic collapse that brought about their physical
collapse, not the other way around. . ..The symbolic collapse came about, then,
by a kind of unpredictable complicity – as though the entire system, by its
internal fragility, joined in the game of its own liquidation, and hence joined
in the game of terrorism. . ..[T]he increase in the power of power heightens
the will to destroy it. . ..[I]t was party to its own destruction.38
Without defending Baudrillard, it is clear that Latour’s gloss on Baudrillard (“the
Towers destroyed themselves”) grossly oversimpliﬁes the argument. To be fair,
Baudrillard’s argument is vague (e.g., where he claims that “it” was party to its
own destruction, it is unclear whether “it” refers to “the power of power” or “the
entire system”). But Latour hardly improves the situation by failing to cite Baudrillard
and by glossing over the distinction between the symbolic collapse of power and the
destruction of the Towers as architectural objects. Latour’s criticism thus has the appeal
of vulgar realism: “if Baudrillard can’t see the obvious, that the buildings were
destroyed by terrorists, then critique has gone too far!” Whether or not one accepts
Baudrillard’s reading, we should recognize what is at stake in Latour’s attack: the
brute rejection of any attempt to interpret an event like September 11 with concepts
like power, capitalism, and hegemony. Even Marxists who cannot abide Baudrillard’s
postmodernism should see the danger here.
The question Latour could have raised is central to critical theory: how should we
understand the ways discourses, empires, or capitalist social relations contribute to the
constitution of “realities?” Such a question could be raised more strongly after Politics
of Nature, and yet Latour wants to foreclose this discussion. Ironically, it is precisely
because arguments about the causes of global warming or September 11 cannot be
closed off that these critical tools must be sustained: the things Latour worries over
are concepts needed to build politically effective collectives. – Joel Wainwright
37J. Baudrillard, “Requiem for the Twin Towers,” in The Spirit of Terrorism, C. Turner, trans. (New York:
Verso, 2002).
38Ibid., pp.47–49.
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Matthew Gandy: Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City.
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002.
This is a book about the social production of nature in New York City over
almost two centuries. It suggests a certain maturity to ideas about the production
of nature which ﬁrst emerged in the 1980s in quite theoretical form but which have
since then been translated into more and more palpable accounts of the daily environ-
ments, urban and rural, in which the vast majority of us live. It chronicles the dramatic
ecological transformation and expansion of New York City since the early 19th cen-
tury through the lenses of urban history, offering a sequence of interlocked environ-
mental episodes as a central thread to the politics of urban change. For those interested
in a critical urban environmentalism, this book is a pivotal text.
An accessible theoretical introduction straps the ensuing argument to an eclectic
range of contemporary social theory while eschewing a narrowly idealist social con-
structionism. As its title suggests, Concrete and Clay is about the water and asphalt
of urban change, the spaces and skyscrapers of the city, as well as the social struggles
and language that make and frame the changing nature of the city. Capitalist urban-
ization is a massive project in nature: this book attempts “to build a conception of
urban nature that is sensitive to the social and historical contexts that produce the
built environment and imbue places with cultural meaning.”
The story of bringing water to “the most thirsty of all great cities,” as Jean Gott-
mann once called New York, is presented in the substantive ﬁrst chapter. It tracks
water needs and supply from the quickly fetid wells of Lower Manhattan’s Collect
Pond, built after the 17th century, to the astonishing infrastructure constructed
between the 1830s and 1970s that accessed water from the Croton and, later, Catskill
reservoir systems. These huge hydraulic construction projects, largely invisible or ille-
gible on the urban surface – tunnels and aqueducts, pumping stations and reservoirs,
water pipes and household plumbing – effectively urbanized the hydrological cycle
while hydrologizing the city’s social economy, welding the natural cycle with cycles
of social, economic and political change in order to provide water for the city’s 8
million people. If this brought a certain democratization of nature – water for all –
it was driven ﬁrst and foremost by a search for efﬁciency in the production of
urban space and nature for capital accumulation. As important as the provision of
drinking water was the need for water to ﬂush pollution and put out ﬁres. Today
therefore, the global campaign to privatize water – costing lives on several continents
– is consistent with the longer term logic of water provision as a vehicle for capital
accumulation, even if neoliberalism brings a shift from public to private ownership.
The recent degeneration of New York’s water system notwithstanding, the trend
and temptation of privatization has been opposed.
The carving out of Central Park in the 1850s is the focus of Chapter 2. This grand
production expressed another crux of social and natural circulatory power: the circu-
lation of aesthetic ideas a la´ the “greensward” envisaged by Olmsted and Vaux; of pur-
iﬁed air for the masses; and of proﬁt-seeking capital for the bourgeoisie. In an early
example of environmental gentriﬁcation, Central Park planners designed the new
REVIEW ESSAYS 123
landscape architecture, planted 270,000 trees and shrubs, and displaced 1,600 poor
New Yorkers. They constructed a “ﬁrst nature” landscape as urban commodity, hik-
ing real estate prices all around. Attempts to tightly control the behavior of park visi-
tors – no sports, no vagabonds, etc. – fell short from the start as the populace asserted
its own rights to the park. That struggle continues today as City Hall, in unison with
the effete Central Park Conservancy, has effectively privatized park management and
selectively denied access to the people (most recently denying the right of protest there
during the 2004 Republican National “Convulsion”). Disney gets the park on lucra-
tive request while anti-war demonstrators are refused.
The primacy of the park as the “lungs of the city” was, however, supplanted dec-
ades earlier, Chapter 3 informs readers, as the ex-urban edge was opened up by a sys-
tem of bridges and “parkways.” The language is important insofar as the experience of
driving was intended to replicate, at speed, a park visit. Where the entire country had
only 8,000 cars in 1900, New York City alone had 1.3 million vehicles only a quarter of
a century later. Much has been made of the role of Robert Moses in building the
asphalt network to accommodate these cars, and despite his early lionization of a
meld of technology and nature, he eventually came to boast that he needed to
“hack” his way through the city itself “with a meat ax.” Gandy is astute at recognizing
the breadth yet limitations to the power of this much-vaunted ﬁgure.
Chapter 4 presents the story, not widely remembered today, of the Young Lords,
Puerto Rican community activists turned revolutionaries in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The Young Lords mobilized Puerto Ricans and others around issues of local
health care, jobs, drugs and environment and presented a broader vision, with
women increasingly in the vanguard, for a different kind of city. For Gandy they
may have strayed into a fateful campaign for Puerto Rican independence, but they
also represented the true, if unheralded, roots of the later environmental justice move-
ment. The ﬁnal chapter takes on the question of waste, raising the specter of
New York City as a waste economy in which recycling, incineration and the export
of garbage are not simply a means of environmental control and regulation but also
a source of proﬁtability – environmentalism makes money. The current mobilization
of people and neighborhoods around environmental issues in the city challenges this
pecuniary rationale but is largely conﬁned to a single-issue politics and does not coher-
ently challenge the larger systems of social and political power – capitalist
urbanization.
Some of the individual stories in this book – water, roads and garbage for
example – are already quite well known, but the originality of Concrete and Clay is
the combination of such stories into a larger picture of the politics of the production
of urban nature. It is broadly successful, engagingly written, and trenchant in convey-
ing a broad canvas of the produced nature we all live in. At times it ﬂattens into a more
sui generis urban history in which the environmental thread is opaque. And although
I share and applaud Gandy’s commitment to demonstrating the imbued environment-
alism of that history, I also think that in the present moment, it might have been
politically useful to pull out a bit more explicitly the nature amidst the urban.
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The struggle since the 1990s over New York’s community gardens, which Gandy
does mention, is one such obvious opening. A more explicit conclusion of the political
implications of this urban environmental canvas – what does all this mean for the pro-
duction of nature thesis? – would also have been useful.
Put differently, this book struggles with and expresses the larger dilemma that we
all confront as scholars and activists concerned with the making of nature, namely
how to meld a certain theoretical sophistication with the prosaic details of everyday
life in the city. If it does not entirely resolve this dilemma, it does far better than almost
any other such effort. In a very positive way, this book naturalizes the social pro-
duction of nature by presenting it as a fact of everyday life, and it does so in a
well-illustrated format with accessible prose that makes the book a tremendous teach-
ing tool. It expands and politicizes how we think about the production of nature, and
invites us to think about how this rich portrait reframes the politics of the production
of nature per se. – Neil Smith
Vandana Shiva:Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit. Cambridge:
South End Press, 2002.
We know what to expect from Vandana Shiva. Her concerns with environmental
exploitation, disappearing indigenous knowledges and global inequalities are
constant themes in her previous work. Water Wars is no exception. In 156 pages,
the charismatic Shiva takes her readers on a whirlwind tour of pressing global
water issues, including water rights and markets, climate change, dams, privatization,
irrigation, the Green Revolution, and water’s sacredness. Drawing primarily on
examples from India, but covering a wide geographic range nonetheless, Shiva
aims to convince the reader of major problems currently facing and rapidly approach-
ing the world’s water drinkers and users. The book’s adjunct materials include a water
hymn from the Rig Veda, a map of India, notes at the ends of chapters, an appendix of
the 180 names for the Ganges River, and a solid index.
Shiva’s title,Water Wars, is explained in her preface: that water is fought over for
a number of reasons ranging from conﬂicts about what water means to different
groups to actual violence over ownership. Often these struggles are masked as
other kinds of conﬂicts, such as ethnic or religious battles. Shiva states that in 20
years of research and activism, she has learned that “[e]conomic globalization is fuel-
ing economic insecurity, eroding cultural diversity and identity, and assaulting the
political freedoms of citizens” (p. xii). These problems in turn, have led to fundament-
alism, terrorism and insecurity. The solution, she says, lies in local, democratic insti-
tutions for self-governance of common property resources. The book’s introduction
discusses the conversion of the earth’s abundant water resources into scarcity through
misuse and overuse. Shiva posits that technical ﬁxes suggested by mainstream devel-
opment institutions erode community control, which leads to shortage. Markets are
not the answer to this problem, she declares, because there is no alternative to
water. Water’s irreplaceability means certain populations are at greater risk.
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Chapter 1 of Water Wars takes up the history of international water rights and
laws. It introduces the reader to common property resources and the evolution of
their governance in India. This is followed by a list of Shiva’s nine principles of
water democracy that markets cannot guarantee. In Chapter 2, Shiva introduces the
reader to relationships between water, global climate disasters, industrial pollution,
and environmental destruction (e.g., ravaging of mangrove swamps for aquaculture).
Chapter 3, “The Colonization of Rivers: Dams and Water Wars,” takes up conﬂicts
over dams and water rights. The spread of U.S. historical water rights as a global para-
digm is suggested. Shiva discusses the (il)logic behind large and small dams in the U.S.
and India. She positions international conﬂicts, such as Israel versus Palestine, as
water conﬂicts and gives the reader an expanded view of the scale of some battles
through examples like disputes over the Nile in East Africa. The World Bank, the
World Trade Organization and water’s commodiﬁcation come under ﬁre in Chapter
4. This is the book’s strongest chapter due to its clear organization. It traces links
between international development aid, global trade agreements, water’s privatization
and the political and economic interests of global water powers, such as Suez Lyon-
naise des Eaux. In Chapter 5, Shiva addresses the relationship of water and food,
focusing speciﬁcally on the drawbacks of the Green Revolution and the dangers of
monocultural cropping that decrease biodiversity and enhance risk, should crops
fail. Chapter 6, “Converting Scarcity into Abundance,” gives numerous Indian
examples of the ways in which communities have historically tackled water shortage
through indigenous technologies and governance systems. Finally, the historic sacred-
ness of the Ganges River and other water bodies are illuminated, as is water’s intrinsic
value, in Chapter 7.
Water Wars does a number of things well. Besides introducing global water crises,
it presents major ﬁgures in these conﬂicts (for example, Sunderlal Bahuguna, Baba
Amte and Medha Patkar, who are ﬁghting against dams on the Narmada River).
Numbers and facts that successfully demonstrate the extent of the crisis are given
throughout the book. Topics are introduced giving enough information for the reader
to grasp and continue with Shiva’s argument without getting bogged down in detail;
for example, Shiva writes a bare-bones explanation of the hydrologic cycle (p. 2)
before launching into examples of practices that lead to water crisis. Shiva is consist-
ently strong when it comes to making simple, compelling arguments. Her convictions
and experience energize the book’s thrust that globalization and privitization threaten
water security for those least able to withstand the strain. She meets her objective of
demonstrating a range of water problems and their linkages to globalization, econ-
omic insecurity, diminished diversity (both biological and cultural) and curtailed
freedoms.
But for this reader, her solutions are less compelling. Shiva romanticizes indigen-
ous solutions to water problems and governance by glossing over power struggles
that occur within communities, institutions and families. While aware of global forces,
Shiva’s suggestions idealize power relations at the local level or ignore them as a factor
in unjust use. She upholds the wisdom of the ancients without due consideration of
subsequent socio-economic changes and population pressures. Shiva is ever the
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idealist, who trusts that local communities will do right. Her example of conﬂicts in
East Africa over the Nile River contrast nicely with the more local problems she out-
lines, but such regional examples also present a dilemma for her continuous insistence
that answers lie in local, traditional systems.
The book’s reasonable price ($14) and short chapters (maximum 34 pages) make
it suitable for assignment as supplemental reading in undergraduate courses. How-
ever, the sheer range of topics and examples undermines the book’s effectiveness
for readers new to water crises. So does Shiva’s use of so many terms in local
languages and speciﬁc Indian examples without maps, pictures or descriptions. If stu-
dents have poor geographic knowledge, it seems likely that much of the “local color”
she includes will not resonate.
The book’s structure is not laid out anywhere, nor is there an overview of each
individual chapter’s contents. This may explain (or be explained by) the failure of the
text to congeal as a cohesive argument and the topical scatteredness within certain
chapters, and occasionally even individual paragraphs. For example, Chapter 5, titled
“Food and Water” and only nine pages long, discusses transnational corporations,
genetically modiﬁed foods, drought resistant crops, industrial agriculture, the
Green Revolution, unsustainability, salinization, water waste, peasant movements,
the shrinking of the Aral Sea, and women in the Indian shrimping industry.
A similar book, Postel’s The Last Oasis,1 is much better organized and has
greater depth and breadth. Cadillac Desert,2 narrates the rich history and power
struggles surrounding water and dams in the American West. Roy’s The Greater
Common Good,3 about the Narmada Dam conﬂict offers a forceful argument, a terriﬁc
map, and statistical information in 62 pages of superior writing. These texts are for-
ceful alternatives to Water Wars, especially if an instructor seeks a book that could be
assigned in sections. In sum, Water Wars covers a multitude of global water topics,
each infused with Shiva’s engaging and personal style, but it is too superﬁcial in
its approach. – Kathleen O’Reilly
1S. Postel, Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).
2M. Reisner, Cadillac Desert: the American West and its Disappearing Water (New York: Viking, 1986).
3A. Roy, The Greater Common Good (Bombay: India Book Distributors, 1999).
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